Book Review - The Way of the Lord Jesus, Volume I
by Germain Grisez
1997
This is a big book. In general, a book requires a good excuse to swell
to such dimensions, but in this case the reason seems proportionate. The book
consists of a short introduction followed by two hundred particular moral cases,
followed finally by two appendices. So, though the book is initially intimidating,
it is not necessary to wade through all nine hundred pages before looking at
the question that interests you. After reading the introduction (which is essential
to understanding the book), one can browse or dip, select any question without
having to read any other. This book in fact proves remarkably accessible, in
many ways the most accessible of the series thus far, for it takes people where
they are, with particular moral questions or dilemmas, and in a very short space
develops the moral considerations relevant to finding some practical solution.
Some might doubt the benefits of such a project. Surely every moral question
is unique and particular practical problems cannot be solved from some
simple manual. People have to make their own decisions from their own perspectives
and there is no way that all of those details could be known in advance. Would
it not be better to stop at the general level, with Christian moral principles,
and let people work out the details for themselves? This objection fails
to see the point of these moral questions. It is not that readers are expected
to be presented with exactly this case, but that they need to learn how to
deal with individual cases, often difficult cases. The importance of this book
lies not in its answers but in its working. The only way to learn how to solve
problems is to look at particular examples and apply, for oneself, the relevant
moral principles.
The main strength of the book is in the method used to approach these problems.
This combines a sophisticated understanding of cooperation (as set forth in the
two appendices) with a great flexibility in the principles applied to differing
cases. Dr. Grisez is not a man in the grip of a theory. Rather, the scope of
his account of basic goods and modes of responsibility gives room for a diversity
of goods and principles to be discovered in the individual case. So the general
theory is open to refinement as particular cases show the need for other principles
of responsibility or of judgment. The rejection of a single simple scale frees
the presentation to genuine openness about the principles required in different
cases. There is not here some apparently simple calculus used to rationalize
decisions made on other grounds (as in the case of all quasi-utilitarian moralists).
There is rather a genuine attempt to understand the variety of goods, circumstances
and principles relevant to each case.
It is instructive to compare this work with that of earlier casuists. One
difference immediately stands out. There is, in this volume, scarcely any attention
paid to the probability of different opinions. An earlier generation of casuists
concerned themselves excessively with which opinions were licit for Catholic
moralists to hold. To defend any particular judgment, appeal was made to the
opinion of various doctors (such as Aquinas, Vitoria, or de Lugo). If an opinion
could find sufficient support among such doctors it was rendered probable. Concern
then focused on whether any act could be undertaken if it was supported by some
degree of probability, or whether only a more probable opinion could be acted
on. Obviously all this abstracts from the actual goods or principles at stake,
and interprets moral theology as a set of Church rules. Grisez characterizes
this approach as legalism, and his presentation is completely free of legalism
in this sense. His authorities are the gospel and the goods and principles which
constitute reasons for acting or desisting from action. He refers to the documents
of the Church only when they are relevant. His reasons are open for examination
and can be accepted, rejected, or modified.
The other feature that most distinguishes this treatment of moral difficulties
from previous treatments is its form. This volume consists not in cases
described in the third person and then analyzed in the third person.
Rather it consists in a number of requests for advice and the subsequent
replies. “Each case
is presented by a conscientious person with a real moral problem who wants a
reasonable answer to the question: What should (or may) I do?” (p. xxiii).
This form is adopted no doubt because the first person reflection (What should
I do?) is thought to be the basis of practical reason. Still another reason also
shapes this form. The requests for advice are clearly thought of as a model for
those who have some pastoral care, and may be asked for such advice. “This
perspective — that of the conscientious person deliberating — should
be adopted by a moral advisor asked questions like those in this book” (p.
849). The book is “intended primarily for use as a seminary text or instructional
resource” (p. xv), that is, it is a text for advisors. This, in
part, explains the form.
The form chosen in the book is, I think, the root of its major failing.
The form aims to accomplish two things, but ends up falling between two
stools. The replies are thought of as though they were actual replies
to real characters (that is, in some pastoral situation). Yet of course
the formulating of such a reply, on the basis of the question (thought
of perhaps as a letter), is long distant from real personal engagement.
No doubt this is a pleasant corrective to the non-directive “never ask questions, never give advice” school
of counseling, but it cannot pass for a real pastoral engagement. The person
himself (or herself) needs to be led gently to come to his (or her) own mind.
This takes delicacy and time, and is a cooperative venture. During this there
will be occasions for speaking clearly and for challenging or refusing to accept
some false compromise, but even in this case it is a judgment of prudence when
and how to speak. Dr. Grisez is well aware of this failing and, to his credit,
devotes some time in his introduction trying to correct the impression that these
replies give “a model for the process of pastoral moral guidance” (p.
xxii). Yet how can they be viewed any other way when the reply explicitly
addresses not the reader but the fictitious questioner? The replies do
not (directly) give an analysis of what someone should do in such and
such a situation. Rather they give an answer to the questioner, thought
of as a conscientious seeker after advice.
In the introduction, no doubt in response to criticism generated in the
course of his researches, Grisez asserts “Packaged answers quickly delivered
seldom help people with their actual problems” (p. xxi). Yet the answers
given here cannot but be taken as attempts to answer, with a single relatively
brief answer, the person’s problem. For the answers are directed to the
questioner! The rhetorical tone suffers greatly from the form into which it is
forced. If one attempts to formulate a reply which is supposed to satisfy a genuine
enquirer with a difficult problem, and must do so in five pages, it will be extraordinarily
difficult to sound other than quick, glib, smug, harsh or pious, or all of the
above.
The title “Difficult Moral Questions” could refer to
practical problems that were perplexing, or to those that were not perplexing
but were emotionally arduous. This book is concerned with the former, though
it would have been helpful to have more discussion of the latter. The whole question
of the arduousness of solution seems underplayed, while even in perplexing cases
it is emotional attachments which make the solution unappealing in practice.
Of course, such gentle weaning of penitents away from bad habits and disentangling
emotionally complex situations (where moral obligations are nonetheless clear)
is a major focus of genuine pastoral engagement. This sort of gentleness fits
ill with the form, and hence the style of this book, which therefore contributes
to its apparent harshness. None of this is to deny the practical conclusions
set out in the book, most of which I would agree with. It is rather a criticism
of the way such advice can be given and so of the form of the present book. It
would have been far better to take the criticisms acknowledged in the introduction
seriously and write, for each case, an extended analysis for the reader — without
pretending to meaningful pastoral dialogue with the questioner.
The style also suffers occasionally from an element of jaundice with
the perceived liberal clerical establishment. Again Dr. Grisez admits
in his introduction that the priests (and religious) in the book are worse
than average, for it is these worse clerics who generate interesting problems.
Yet many of the comments which are made about Catholic universities, Catholic
hospitals, bishops and priests in the book are hardly necessary. It seems that
when Dr. Grisez applies some color to his examples the colors are often the
same. Whether or not the situation of the American Catholic Church warrants
this, it is bad rhetorically. Perhaps many of these examples are amalgams of
true cases. Nevertheless the preponderance of cases of certain sorts certainly
seems to be an attempt to persuade by rhetoric, rather than argument, and this
becomes tiresome. This is unfortunate, for I imagine there are many who would
be interested in this work (especially this particular work), but would be
put off by the tone.
Having criticized the form, I should add a note of appreciation for much
of the method. One refreshing thing is the extent to which theological
themes shape the general approach. Three large themes could be mentioned.
First, mercy as a principle of Christian action is developed in many of the
questions. In this volume, as in Volume II, it is asserted that mercy is obligatory,
not supererogatory for Christians. Perhaps I could qualify this by agreeing
that the habit or virtue of mercy is obligatory, and in some situations a failure
to be merciful would be an offense against mercy (when presented by great
need). Nevertheless I think that in general, mercy, like generosity, which
is an allied virtue of large-heartedness, makes no sense unless it is gratuitous.
A choice to be just but not (on this occasion), generous, is not an act against
generosity, as seems clear in the Gospel (Matthew 20, 1-15).
A third theological concept that seems to play a structural role for
the whole project is damnation. Many questions pay particular attention
to the danger of leaving someone in sin unrepentant. Even victims are considered,
as regarding any complicity they might have, and therefore what need
they might have for repentance and reconciliation. Babies and unbaptized believers
should be baptized if in danger of death. Hell is a real possibility and charity
demands we do all we can, not only to save ourselves, but also to save others
from futility. Thus the spirited attack on Hans Urs von Balthasar (p. 21-28)
is not so tangential as it, at first, appears. For the real possibility of
hell is a strong motivating force behind much of the book, and indeed the project
as a whole.
However, one argument of Dr. Grisez in this area is clearly invalid. He
claims that because Jesus said that those who have done evil will go
to perdition, then there will be people in Hell. If these threats remain unrealized
the Holy Spirit “may have been bluffing, that is, may have lied.”!
(p. 25) But I can say truthfully “Trespassers will be prosecuted” and
yet hope that no one trespasses, and so no one is prosecuted. An officer
may warn the soldiers under his command of the real danger of straying
from the safe path across a minefield, and the danger is real, but he
can still hope that everyone gets across safely. If fear of hell is salutary
then perhaps some are saved from hell by the fear of hell. Hell is a
real possibility for anyone who dies unrepentant in grave sin, yet we
may hope that, by the grace of God, no one will die in such a state.
Of course, we cannot know this, and must not be presumptuous, but neither
can we know that there are souls in hell, and we must not despair, of
ourselves or of anyone else. In short, I think that a healthy awareness
of what damnation means and the real human possibility of it, are salutary
things, and it is good to see a moral theologian take them on board.
However, I do not think impious those who hope that, in the end, all
will be saved.
Many of the questions in this book are genuinely difficult so that loyal
conscientious Catholics might come to different conclusions. Dr. Grisez
himself remarks, “no one who contributed to the book agrees with everything
in it” (p. xxxi).
Nevertheless, for the record, these are a few of the concrete judgments
that, in this reviewer’s opinion, are unacceptable: Surely everyone
has a duty to feed himself or herself and care for his or her own bodily
life except in the most extreme cases (of sacrificing one’s own
life for that of another). Thus it cannot be reasonable to make an advanced
directive suggesting that “if
he or she were in that [persistently unconscious] conditions, no care
be given, in order to save others the costs and other burdens of giving
it” (p.
223).
Is it true that becoming pregnant “has nothing to do with the good
of marriage” (p. 242)? If a technician makes my wife pregnant with
her sister’s baby, this seems to compromise the bond of our marriage
and the good of procreation. Pregnancy seems to be an intrinsic element
in the procreative good of marriage, not only an element of child rearing
that might be done by anyone.
Should a young mother attached to her child and no danger to it be persuaded “to
give him up” (p. 187), for what are, presumably, financial reasons?
Dr. Grisez seems to seriously undervalue the good of knowing one’s
own self and one’s own natural parents, even when this does not
lead to any satisfying relationship (cf. p. 189-192). He fails to give
an account that would explain why those involved pressed so hard for
a legal right to trace natural parents. In general his account of the
natural bond seems too weak, and of the process of adoption too sanguine
(which is not to deny that it can be the occasion of much good).
I was shocked and thought scandalous the suggestion that a daughter should
be encouraged to make a formal act of renunciation of the Church (p.
169), for the sake of having a valid marriage (when she would have been
in good faith with regard to the invalid marriage). There was no account given
of the grave wrong of formally breaking communion with the Church, and
what formal cooperation with that wrong would involve.
Finally, the suggestion that smoking was a “grave matter” (p.
601) shows up the cultural context in which it was written, that is,
the American attitude to these things (and perhaps give a new twist to the
adage “There’s
no smoke without fire.”). Though there would seem to be little
doubt that smoking is a vice, a decision about its gravity requires a
more sophisticated account of risk than is given anywhere in this volume,
or, with respect, in Volume II.
There are no questions here involving war and deterrence, murder and
self-defense, or capital punishment (this last to my great disappointment).
Yet these topics may reasonably have been thought beyond the scope of
the book, and have been treated elsewhere. Most curiously, what used to be
thought of as the difficult moral question in medical ethics, the area of therapeutic
abortion, ectopic pregnancy and craniotomy, is not treated here. This
is surely deliberate and in the context of the subject matter of this book
seems an unjustified omission, even though it has been treated elsewhere.
This book made me appreciate more of what Thomas Aquinas meant when he
said that, “In matters of action, practical truth or rectitude
is the same only in what is common, not in matters proper to some person.
And even when the practical truth involved is the same, it is not equally
known to all” (Summa
Theologiae IaIIae Q. 94, 4). As we descend from general principles to
particular conclusions, the particular circumstances become more important
and the application of the principles requires more practical insight.
Prudence only comes with maturity and requires the guidance of holy and
wise examples as well as personal experience. It is a very ambitious
project to set about answering so many particular questions, for it requires
a deep understanding of the human practices involved. If I thought this
task sometimes beyond the author, and some of the answers seemed lacking
in nuance, that should not be thought too harsh a criticism, for serious
reflection on so many diverse areas is a standard against which one would
not wish to be measured oneself.
In general this is a useful, serious book, full of insights into many (if
not all) the principles involved in resolving the most perplexing of
moral questions. It is certainly a great contribution to the neglected discipline
of casuistry, and in many places was illuminating for the present reviewer.
My hope is that this format — of many individual questions — will make this
school of thought appealing to a far wider audience than has hitherto
treated it seriously. The construction of the questions themselves is
a service to those interested in exercising their practical reason, and
for this alone the book deserves a wide welcome. This book is a substantial
contribution to the field of moral theology.
— David Albert Jones, OP Oxford
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